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Red, Yellow, and Green: Measuring the Quality of 401(k) Portfolio Choices
Gary R. Mottola and Stephen P. Utkus

The shift over the past quarter century from professionally managed defined benefit (DB)
plans to participant-directed defined contribution (DC) plans has meant that employees must take
an active role in managing their retirement assets. However, some participants may not be
willing or able to manage their assets. Surveys of participants suggest that many are
inexperienced and have low levels of financial literacy. Some participants appear to make
obvious portfolio errors, such as concentrating their portfolio in employer stock or holding tooconservative portfolio. Many make subtle construction errors, failing to diversify their equity
portfolio more broadly with small-capitalization or international stocks.1 In response to these
concerns, the 2006 Pension Protection Act (PPA) in the US envisions a new type of 401(k) plan
– the autopilot or automatic 401(k) – in which more participants are automatically enrolled into
qualified default investments designed by investment professionals. The PPA also encourages
greater provision of investment advice to participants. Yet even if automatic plan designs or
advisory services grow quickly, it remains the case that the vast majority of nearly 60 million
private-sector DC plan participants have constructed their portfolios on their own, without
professional help.
How well are participants faring in the task of portfolio construction? In this chapter, we
assess investment literacy among 401(k) plan participants by measuring the quality of their
portfolio decisions compared to professional investment advice. In general, we find that many
participants appear to adopt reasonable levels of equity exposure: specifically, nearly 45%
participants construct “green” portfolios with equity allocations consistent with expert advice,
while just over 25% build “yellow” portfolios that have meaningful equity holdings, but appear
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to be invested either too aggressively or conservatively. At the same time, three in ten
participants construct “red” portfolios with egregious portfolio errors, including zero
participation in the equity markets or overexposure to single-stock risk. At a finer level of detail,
many participants fail to take advantage of additional opportunities for diversification, such as
diversifying holdings with international or small-capitalization stocks or high-quality bonds
when they are offered. Few participants own more specialized asset classes (e.g., high-yield
bonds), which are not made available by plan sponsors in the first place.
Besides assessing the quality of portfolio choices, we are also able to estimate the cost of
portfolio errors. Portfolio errors can be costly—anywhere from roughly 60 to 350 basis points in
expected real return per year based on our estimates. Our demographic models also suggest that
lower income, lower wealth, and less financially sophisticated participants incur the largest costs,
in terms of reduced expected returns, because they are more likely to invest in an ultraconservative manner. This same population would be the largest beneficiary of strategies to
improve 401(k) portfolio diversification. At the other extreme, older, affluent and male
participants, who typically invest quite aggressively, may see expected portfolio returns fall if
they were to shift to “better” portfolios. But overall portfolio efficiency levels would still rise.
Plan sponsors and policymakers overseeing defined contribution programs have several
remedial strategies for improving participant portfolio allocations. These include: greater
reliance on professionally managed default investment funds; the introduction of managed
account advisory services; and the “mapping” of existing participant accounts to new default
funds. Investment education may also be effective, but the impact of education on actual
behavior is highly debated. Regardless of the remedial strategy adopted, our research suggests
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that through such approaches, a meaningful group of participants could improve expected returns
or diversification levels (or both), thus enhancing their prospects for retirement security.
In this chapter, after reviewing the prior research on 401(k) investment decisions and
describing our data set, we first assess the quality of portfolio decisions, and then turn to
estimating the costs of poor portfolio choices. We conclude by discussing implications for
sponsors and policymakers overseeing defined contribution retirement programs.
Prior research
Prior research on 401(k) investment decision-making falls broadly under three themes:
behavioral biases, portfolio allocations and trading activity, and financial literacy.
One of the most important themes of the behavioral finance research has been the impact
on the employer-designed 401(k) menu on participant investment choices. With small menus,
participants appear to follow a naïve “1/n” heuristic, allocating their savings evenly among menu
options; in larger menus, this effect appears in the form of a “conditional 1/n” heuristic, where
participants tend to divide their savings equally among a subset of funds they select from the
menu. Also, menus with a higher proportion of equity funds tend to result in participant
allocations with higher equity exposure. The same is true if the menu has more high-cost active
equity funds. Meanwhile, 401(k) investment menus with many options appear to give rise to
“choice overload,” either leading to lower plan participation or to reliance on familiar,
conservative investment choices. One possible explanation for these effects is that, contrary to
neoclassical models of revealed preferences and portfolio choice, participants may have unstable
preferences – perhaps due in part to deficiencies in financial education – that are easily subject to
framing effects.2
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The role of procrastination or inertia as a decision heuristic is also evident in 401(k)
portfolios. The inertia effects are best known in the context of automatic enrollment in 401(k)
plans. But they also apply to the tendency of participants to fail to revisit their ongoing
investment allocations. For example, 45% of higher-education plan participants never changed
their asset allocation over a 10-year period. Research on 401(k) trading underscores this finding.
These studies demonstrate that only 10% of participants trade in any given year, far below the
rate that might be expected from periodic rebalancing of portfolios.3
A third strand of research places 401(k) portfolio choices in the context of overall
questions of participant financial literacy or experience. According to one national survey, 42%
of 401(k) participants describe themselves as “novice” or “beginner” investors and a similar
percentage as “little or somewhat experienced.” Only 15% say they are knowledgeable or
experienced investors. Another survey demonstrates that some 401(k) participants believe
money market funds include stock investments; few understand the inverse relationship of bond
prices and yields; and many find their employer stock to be a safer investment than a diversified
portfolio. More broadly, one of the substantive “investment mistakes” made by some American
households, particularly lower-income or lower-wealth households, is the failure to participate in
the equity markets—the failure to take any equity risk whatsoever. In addition, while many
older Americans understand basic percentages, they struggled with basic financial calculations
such as compound interest or the division of a lottery prize among four individuals. Low levels
of financial literacy tend to be associated with younger age, lower income, lower levels of
educational attainment, female sex and lower wealth. 4
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Approach and Data
In our analysis of 401(k) portfolios, we first develop a set of qualitative measures of
portfolio construction. The result is our “red, green and yellow” taxonomy reflecting the relative
quality of portfolio decisions. This analysis is based on a large data set drawn from Vanguard’s
401(k) recordkeeping systems, which we refer to as our full sample. The full sample
encompasses over 2,000 defined contribution plans and nearly 2.9 million 401(k) participants as
of December 31, 2005.
The second part of our analysis develops first-order estimates of the cost of portfolio
choices—both in terms of forfeited return or reduced diversification levels. This analysis is
based on a much smaller dataset, called the managed account sample. It consists of nearly
12,000 participants drawn from the full sample who adopted a managed account service in the
twelve months prior to September 2005.5 A managed account service is a third party,
professional advisory service authorized for 401(k) plans by the US Department of Labor in its
2001 “SunAmerica” advisory opinion. Participants who sign up for the managed account cede
all investment control to the advisor, which reallocates the participant’s plan balance to conform
to the advisor’s investment recommendations. The adviser also assumes control for ongoing
management and rebalancing of the portfolio. For this sample, we were able to obtain portfolio
risk and return measures from the third party adviser, Financial Engines, both before and after
the adoption of a professional advisory service. The managed account sample is by definition
not a random sample of the broader dataset. But the results from our analysis of this smaller data
set are in our view at least a good first-order approximation of the costs associated with various
suboptimal portfolio strategies for a larger group of participants.
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Table 1 summarizes characteristics of the two data sets. In the full sample, the median
participant was 44 years old, was male, worked for his employer for 8.5 years, had a household
income of $87,500, and had accumulated of nearly $24,000 in 401(k) savings at year-end 2005.
Half of participants in the sample were registered for online access to their 401(k) accounts. The
managed account sample is broadly similar to the full sample, but with some marked differences.
Participants in the managed account sample were somewhat older, longer tenured, and more
female, and somewhat more likely to be registered for internet access. They also tended to hold
less in diversified equities overall and in company stock. They obviously differ from other
participants in their willingness to adopt an advisory service when it was first offered.
Table 1 here
Quality of Portfolio Decisions
The first part of our analysis examines the degree to which participants in the full sample
conform to simple portfolio construction rules provided by portfolio experts. We begin by
assessing the quality of “gross” portfolio construction—namely, participants’ overall risk
exposure to equities, and their willingness to expose themselves to single-stock rather than
diversified equity market risk. Specifically, we determine to what degree participant portfolios
conform to the following three rules:
1. The diversified equities rule. We assume that portfolios with between 40% and 95% equity
exposure are consistent with well-accepted standards of portfolio practice based on two
independent investment methodologies. In our managed account sample, Financial Engines
(Vanguard’s managed account provider) generally recommends overall portfolio allocations
to equities ranging from 40% to 95% of 401(k) account assets.6 In addition, the equity
allocations for Vanguard age-based lifecycle funds range from approximately 45% to 90%
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for individuals in their working years. Thus, we define as “green” diversified equity
exposure ranging from 40% to 95%.
2. The zero-equity error rule. A common portfolio error cited in the financial economics
literature is a household’s decision to hold zero percent of financial wealth in equities. An
approximation of this rule for 401(k) plans is for participants to hold zero percent of their
401(k) assets in equities.7 As such, we define portfolios with zero equity exposure as making
an egregious or “red” portfolio error.
3. The company stock rule. While neoclassical models of portfolio choice would suggest a zero
allocation to single-stock risk, there are mixed findings on the motivational aspects of
employer stock. As a result, we define as egregious or “red” any portfolio with more than
20% of assets in company stock. This rule is consistent with the limit also imposed by the
Vanguard managed account service; it is also the rule included in mandatory disclosure to
participants regarding company stock risk under the 2006 Pension Protection Act.8
These portfolio construction rules, applied to our 2.9 million account sample, result in
five investor segments shown in Table 2. We use a simple stoplight color scheme to reflect the
extent to which participant portfolios conform to our three rules of portfolio construction. Fortythree percent of portfolios are in the Green segment, with equity allocations ranging from 40% to
95% and company stock exposure less than 20%.9 Twenty five percent of portfolios are in the
Yellow segment because their equity exposure is outside our Green 40-95% range, but non-zero.
Thirty percent are in one of two Red segments, with either zero in equities or a concentrated
stock position exceeding 20%.
Table 2 here

8

This color scheme refers only to our three basic rules of portfolio construction. What
about finer levels of portfolio construction—such as the decision to diversify equity holdings
more broadly, or to hold volatile bonds over principal-stable investments like guaranteed
investment contracts (GICs) or money market funds? Table 3 demonstrates that most plans
offer, and most participants in our full sample are offered, the opportunity to diversify their
equity holdings using mid- and small-capitalization US stocks and international developed
market stocks, and to diversify their fixed income holdings with high-quality bonds. Yet less
than three in ten participants avail themselves of these three classes. Other specialized asset
classes – such as emerging market stocks10, non-US bonds, real estate investment trusts, and
Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) – are by and large not widely offered by sponsors
in the first place. When offered, few participants take up these specialized options.
Table 3 here
Overall our results suggest that at a gross portfolio construction level, many participants
have healthy portfolios. Forty-five percent construct portfolios consistent with third-party expert
rules, while another 25%, while assuming equity market risk, take levels that are either too
aggressive or too conservative by the rules we set forth. An important minority fail at the
extremes by constructing “red” portfolios that are too conservatively invested, or too
concentrated in employer stock. Of course, participants may be in a given portfolio for several
reasons. For example, they may understand rudimentary investment principles or have welldeveloped preferences; they may have been defaulted into a given portfolio; or they may have
applied some naive decision heuristic, like the “1/n” rule. In terms of finer levels of portfolio
construction, only three in ten appear to utilize more sophisticated diversification strategies.11
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Table 4 summarizes the main investment patterns for each of the five segments identified
above. Not surprisingly, Red (Zero Equity) investors invest almost exclusively in stableprincipal investments such as money market funds and guaranteed investment contract (GICs)
funds and to a limited extent in bonds. Yellow (Conservative Equity) investors have a high
weighting to stable-principal investments as well. Both of these segments no doubt reflect either
high levels of risk aversion and a preference for capital stability—or a lack of knowledge about
the benefits, even for cautious investors, of investing in high-quality bond funds relative to
shorter duration instruments. The participants who take on extended levels of diversification with
international or mid- and small-capitalization US stocks are largely in two segments, Green and
Yellow (Aggressive Equity). One noteworthy finding is the high use of balanced, life-cycle, and
life-style funds among the Green segment–-no doubt a reflection of the growing popularity of
these funds and their increasing as default investment options in 401(k) plans.12
Table 4 here
For our five investor segments, which demographic characteristics are associated with
membership in each segment?

Figure 1 graphically summarizes the relationship between

demographic characteristics and investor type (see the Appendix for technical details). After
controlling for various demographic variables, the conservatively invested segments—that is,
participant portfolios classified as Red (No Equity) and Yellow (Conservative)—are more likely
to be held by older, less affluent, or unengaged participants.13 This finding is consistent with
studies that show financial literacy is particularly low for the less educated, those with low
income, and minorities.14 The more aggressively invested Yellow segment tends to have
younger, more affluent, and engaged participants. Since financial literacy is associated with
affluence, it would appear at broad brush that affluence, financial literacy and equity risk-taking
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go hand in hand. Yet in our analysis, even these affluent and aggressive Yellow investors may be
taking too much risk according to our portfolio construction rules.
Figure 1 here
The Cost of Portfolio Choices
We next turn to developing first-order estimates of the costs associated with suboptimal
portfolio decisions. This analysis relies on our managed account sample described earlier.
For the nearly 12,000 participants who signed up for the program, the managed account
advisory service dramatically changed their portfolio allocations. Figure 2 depicts the “before”
and “after” equity allocations for these participants. Prior to the adoption of the advisory service,
42% of participants were at three focal points: zero equities, 100% equities, and 50% equities
(which represented the presence of a balanced default investment option in several of the large
plans in this sample). The remaining participants were scattered across the equity allocation
spectrum, with anywhere from 10% to 90% or more of account holdings invested in equities.
After the advisory service took control of participant accounts, extreme equity holdings were
entirely eliminated. Moreover, in a quite dramatic way, portfolio equity holdings became more
normally distributed, with a mean equity exposure of 76% and a standard deviation of 12%.
Figure 2 here
To evaluate the impact of these dramatic changes, we first classified the participants in
the managed account sample using our five red/green/yellow “investor segment” methodology
described above. In turn, using data provided by the third party adviser, Financial Engines, we
estimated portfolio returns and Sharpe ratios both before and after adoption of the service. 15
The returns reported are real returns—expected returns after projected inflation. The returns are
also net of fund expenses, but the cost of the managed account service has not been deducted
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from any of the returns. The Vanguard managed account service has a base fee of 0.40% per
year (with a sliding scale for high-asset accounts), but fees vary widely depending on the sponsor
of the managed account program.
Table 5 presents “before” and “after” expected returns and Sharpe ratios for each of the
five segments in the managed account sample. These results provide estimates of the costs or
inefficiencies associated with a given type of portfolio strategy chosen by the participant
compared to a portfolio selected by a professional adviser. For Red (Zero Equity) participants,
not surprisingly, the costs in terms of lower expected returns are dramatic: these participants
forfeit 358 basis points in expected return. Even Green portfolios experience gains in expected
return of 63 basis points due to improvements in portfolio strategy. However, note that the
adoption of professional advice does not lead to improvements in expected real returns across the
board. The most aggressive investors – Yellow (Aggressive Equity) and Red (Company Stock)
– actually see expected returns fall as their portfolios are diversified away from high levels of,
respectively, diversified equities and company stock specific risk. In both groups, however,
expected returns per unit of risk improve. For all investor segments, Sharpe ratios (as a measure
of portfolio efficiency) improve. The largest gains in Sharpe ratios occur for zero-equity holders
and for those eliminating company stock risk.
Table 5 here
In addition, we examined which demographic segments might benefit the most – in terms
of improved portfolio risk and return characteristics – if they were to adopt “greener” portfolio
strategies. Results from our model are showed in Figure 3 (with details in Table 6 in the
Appendix). All demographic groups experienced an improvement in performance after managed
account adoption, but the relative size of the improvement varied. As shown in the Figure, a
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hypothetical managed account adopter—in this case defined as non-high-wealth, medium
household income, non-web registered, female of average age, account balance, and tenure—
experiences a 1.50% increase in her expected return. However, if we hold everything constant
about this average participant but change her sex to male, this hypothetical participant
experiences a 0.91% increase in expected return after managed account adoption—an
improvement in performance significantly greater than zero but also significantly less than that
of a female participant. Similarly, if we hold everything constant but change the hypothetical
participant to a high wealth participant, they experience a 1.65% increase in expected return
instead of 1.50%.
Figure 3 here
Summary and Implications
Our analysis of participant portfolio choice indicates that nearly 45% of participants
construct “green” portfolios based on their overall exposure to a diversified level of equity
market risk, while another 25% or so construct “yellow” portfolios with possibly too-aggressive
or too-conservative equity holdings. Another three in ten make egregious or “red” portfolio
errors, either by not investing in equities at all, or by over-concentrating their portfolio in
employer stock. At a finer level of portfolio detail, most participants (with some exceptions) do
not appear to engage in additional levels of portfolio diversification, such as holding mid- and
small-capitalization US, non-US stocks or high-quality bonds, despite the widespread availability
of these options and the potential for increased portfolio efficiency that they offer. Some
portfolio diversification errors are clearly related to employer plan design (e.g., the availability of
company stock or the lack of specialized diversification options), though many participants in
our sample have access to a wide range of broad asset classes.
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Our estimates suggest that portfolio errors can be costly. The most costly errors are made
by Red (Zero Equity) participants, those who hold no equities in their 401(k) account; the
potential gain from improving their portfolios is estimated at over 350 basis points in real return
per year. Yet even Green investors can improve portfolio performance by 60 basis points or
more through better portfolio construction. Gains are also possible in terms of portfolio
efficiency as measured by Sharpe ratios. For plan sponsors overseeing a given defined
contribution plan, the potential gains at the plan level will of course depend on the proportion of
investor segments in the plan population. For example, a plan with a large Red (Zero Equity)
will experience more dramatic improvements in expected returns than, say, a population with
more Green or Yellow (Aggressive Equity) investors. Similarly, a plan with many aggressively
oriented participants is likely to see expected returns fall, while efficiency measures improve.
The participants most likely to experience improvements in expected returns and Sharpe
ratios from better portfolio strategies are those whose characteristics are typically associated with
low levels of financial literacy—namely, lower income and less engaged participants. More
aggressive investors, who are more often affluent men, may experience reductions in returns, but
still see improvements in overall portfolio efficiency.
There are a variety of strategies that sponsors and policymakers might pursue in order to
improve participant portfolios and reduce the costs of portfolio errors. Continued financial
education is one avenue, and indeed, investor education materials are already quite common
within the 401(k) marketplace. However, their main drawback is that education programs appear
to yield few actual changes in portfolio strategy, due to the widespread prevalence of inertia
among participants. Educational programs can alter people’s attitudes and intentions regarding
investment planning; the challenge arises with follow through and executing on intentions.16 An
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alternative approach is to promote automatic enrollment of participants into well-designed
default funds. This is the premise underlying the Pension Protection Act (PPA), and in keeping
with its provisions, the U.S. Department of Labor has proposed new regulations encouraging the
greater use of “qualified default investment alternatives” (QDIAs).

Advice programs may also

improve portfolios. They typically come with incremental costs for the advisory service,
although those costs must be compared with the potential gains in portfolio expected returns
and/or diversification levels that may occur, at least for some segments of participants.
Another possible strategy is the notion of mapping plan participants to “better”
investment allocations. Under U.S. fiduciary law, plan sponsors generally remain the ultimate
party responsible for the investment of plan assets. If they so choose, they are able to “map” (or
shift) all plan participants balances into other investment funds, such as professionally managed
default investments.17 Such a strategy could potentially improve portfolio allocations quickly,
given the tendency of most participants to rely on default choices made by others. And by
including a right to opt-out of the mapping, such a strategy could address the needs of those
participants who have strong preferences to retain their existing choices.
Addressing over-concentration of company stock is more difficult due to the fact that
some companies match in company stock, and such matching contributions appear to be the
principal determinant of concentrated stock holdings. One option is for sponsors to match
“in cash” (i.e., into the funds the employee has selected) rather than in employer stock. A second
strategy is to impose limits on concentrated holdings by employees. Advice programs like
managed accounts are a third approach, as the advisory service takes responsibility for the
liquidation of employer stock, and the employer is not responsible for encouraging the sale of
shares of employer stock. A final option is the “sell more tomorrow” program, in which
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participants are defaulted into a reverse dollar-cost averaging service that gradually liquidates
their stock holdings down to a reduced level over time.18
One consideration in interpreting the results of our study is that we are assessing
participant holdings based on a single 401(k) account, whereas participants could be constructing
portfolios at the household level. For example, we might classify a participant portfolio as Red
(Zero Equity), but the participant or the participant’s spouse or partner may have assets invested
in equities in other accounts that we do not observe. In total, their household portfolio could be
Green. While we acknowledge that this is a possibility, our research suggests that for many
participants their current 401(k) account is their only meaningful financial investment. Nearly
50% of our participants have less than $10,000 in non-retirement assets. Furthermore, a 2006
study from the Employee Benefit Research Institute found that for nearly a third of participants,
their retirement savings in their employer plan represented “all or almost all” of their total
retirement savings and for another 15%, their employer plan represented three-quarters of their
total retirement savings.19 Given that most participants have no or few assets outside their plan,
our belief is that this problem may be limited in scope—and confined to the more affluent
participants in our sample, who already construct Yellow or Green portfolios anyway.
An intriguing question raised by our research is whether or not informing participants of
their color-coded segment (through their quarterly statements or on the web) would influence
their investment behavior. Given the widely demonstrated power of inertia in definedcontribution investing and the fairly limited effects of investor education, we believe that this
knowledge would not impact participant investment behavior in a meaningful manner. However,
informing a plan sponsor that 30% of their participants are in the Red segment could motivate
the sponsor to alter the design of the plan. In any event, future research might explore the impact
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of informing participants about their investor segment or plan sponsors about the distribution of
segments within their plan.
Overall it seems that participant portfolios are quite heterogeneous, and efforts to
improve portfolio allocations by sponsors will depend on the specific segments that predominate
in a given plan. Any gains in expected real returns from improvements in portfolio strategy are
likely to be largest among populations typically associated with low levels of financial literacy,
especially low-wealth and unengaged participants. Meanwhile, participants who invest in an
overly aggressive manner, such as affluent male investors, may benefit from greater portfolio
efficiency and diversification.
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics

n=
Demographics
Median age
Percent male
Median job tenure
Median household income
Percent high wealth*
Percent web registered
Investment
Median plan assets
Percent equity exposure
Percent company stock exposure

Managed
Account
Sample
11,729

Full Sample
2,857,089

$

$

44.0
64%
8.5
87,500
21%
49%

23,784
67%
11%

$

$

50.0
48%
13.2
95,951
20%
56%

38,572
57%
7%

* Data from the IXI company were used to impute nonretirement plan household financial wealth
at the ZIP+4 level. High wealth participants are defined as participants with over $50,000
in non-retirement household wealth (the top 20%).
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Table 2. Investor Segments
Panel A. Summary of Segments
Investor Segment
A. Green
B. Yellow (conservative equity)
C. Yellow (aggressive equity)
D. Red (zero equity)
E. Red (company stock)

Percent
43.1%
6.9%
19.3%
13.4%
17.2%

Panel B. Segments in Detail
Company Stock Exposure

Equity Exposure
1) Zero
2) 1 to 39
3) 40 to 94
4) 95 to 99
5) 100
TOTAL

Note: Based on full sample.

D
B
A
C

1) Zero

2) 1 to 19

3) 20 to 39

13.4%
5.2%
37.5%
3.3%
13.7%

1.7%
5.7%
1.0%
1.3%

0.8%
3.7%
0.6%
1.1%

73.1%

9.6%

6.1%

E

4) 40 to 99

5) 100

TOTAL

3.9%
1.6%
1.4%

4.2%

13.4%
7.7%
50.7%
6.6%
21.7%

6.9%

4.2%

100.0%
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Table 3. Type of Investment Options Used

Category

Percent of Plans
Percent of
Offering
Participants Offered

Percent of
Partcipants Offered
and Using

Large Cap US equities
Money Market/GIC
Balanced/Life-Cycle/Life-Style
High quality bond
International equities
Small/Midcap US equities

99%
98%
97%
97%
95%
93%

98%
98%
95%
95%
96%
96%

65%
44%
43%
26%
25%
29%

REITs
Speciality/Sector
High-yield bonds
TIPS
Emerging markets
Company stock
World bonds

21%
19%
16%
16%
13%
12%
0%

15%
13%
15%
20%
15%
46%
2%

8%
12%
8%
4%
6%
58%
1%

Note: Based on full sample.

Table 4. Participant Asset Allocations by Investor Segment
Percent of assets

Category
Large Cap
Balanced/Life-Cycle/Life-Style
Small & Mid Cap
Money Market/GIC
Bond
International
Company Stock
Other
TOTAL

Percent Equity Exposure
Note: Based on full sample.

Yellow
Red (Zero (Conservative
Equity)
Equity)
0%
8%
0%
16%
0%
1%
92%
55%
7%
14%
0%
1%
0%
2%
2%
1%
100%
100%

0%

21%

Green
36%
34%
7%
7%
7%
5%
1%
2%
100%

Yellow
(Aggressive
Equity)
68%
1%
16%
0%
0%
9%
1%
4%
100%

Red
(Company
Stock)
16%
6%
4%
8%
3%
2%
61%
0%
100%

73%

99%

87%
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Table 5. Portfolio Return and Risk Characteristics by Investor Segment
Panel A. Expected Real Returns After Fund Expenses (1)

Segment
Red (Zero Equity)
Yellow (Conservative Equity)
Green
Yellow (Aggressive Equity)
Red (Company Stock)
Total

Before
Managed
Account
1.76%
3.02%
5.09%
6.63%
7.68%
4.86%

After
Managed
Methodology
Account
Adjustment (2)
5.41%
-0.07%
5.70%
-0.10%
5.87%
-0.15%
6.00%
-0.19%
6.14%
-0.21%

Change in
Expected
Return
3.58%
2.58%
0.63%
-0.82%
-1.75%

Percent
Change
203%
85%
12%
-12%
-23%

0.82%

17%

After
Managed
Methodology Change in
Account
Adjustment (2) Sharpe Ratio
0.316
-0.0064
0.198
0.318
-0.0025
0.066
0.319
-0.0043
0.011
0.318
-0.0049
0.024
0.313
-0.0081
0.072

Percent
Change in
Sharpe
Ratio
179%
26%
4%
8%
31%

5.83%

-0.15%

Panel B. Sharpe Ratios

Segment
Red (Zero Equity)
Yellow (Conservative Equity)
Green
Yellow (Aggressive Equity)
Red (Company Stock)
Total

Before
Managed
Account
0.111
0.250
0.304
0.289
0.233
0.256

0.318

-0.0049

0.057

Projected returns are based upon Financial Engines' forecasting methodology, which projects the likelihood of
various investment outcomes that are hypothetical in nature. The expected returns do not reflect actual results
and are not guarantees of future results.
Note: Based on managed account sample.
(1) Expected returns are after fund expenses but before the separate fee charged by the managed account service.
(2) These adjustments reflect changes over time in the sub-adviser's expected returns and/or covariance matrix. See text.

22%
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Figure 1. Relationship Between Demographics and Investor Segment Membership
Relative Marginal Probabilities
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%

Age (10)

Male

Assets
(10K)

Tenure

High
wealth

Household Household
Web
registered
income low income
high

-30%
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-50%
-60%
-70%
Red (Zero Equity)

Yellow (Conservative)
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Figure 2. Impact of Managed Account on Equity Exposure
Before managed account adoption
25%

% Participants
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After managed account adoption
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Equity Exposure

Note: Based on managed account sample.
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Figure 3. Relationship Between Demographics and Portfolio Improvement
Change in expected return pre/post managed account implementation
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Appendix
Investor Segments
Figure 1 summarizes marginal effects from a multinomial logit regression analyzing the impact
of participant demographics on membership in a given investor segment in Table 1. The general
form of the model is Pr( Segmenti , j ) = β 0 + β1 X i , j + ε i , j , where the dependent variable is the

probability of being in one of the investor segments shown, with the “green” segment as the
reference category.

We excluded “red (company stock)” participants from the analysis since

their holdings of company stock were not influenced by demographic factors but by the plan
sponsor’s decision to place company stock in the 401(k) menu.

Portfolio Changes and Demographics
Figure 3 summarizes changes from a “difference in difference” ordinary least squares model
relating portfolio expected returns and Sharpe ratios to demographic characteristics. The sample
is our managed account sample. The empirical model for E (ri , j ,t ) , the expected returns for the
ith participant account in the jth plan at time t, is as follows:

E (ri , j ,t ) = β 0 + β1Treatmenti , j ,t + β 2 Yi , j ,t + β 3Z i , j ,t + ε i , j ,t . We observe each participant portfolio
at two points in time: prior to the managed account adoption (September 2004) and after
(December 2005). Our independent variables include a within-subject Treatment variable (i.e.,
set to 1 if after adoption of the managed account and 0 before adoption) and a vector of
demographic variables Yi,j,t. Furthermore, we interact the Treatment variable with the betweengroup demographic variables such as gender, age, and web registration in Zi,j,t. Observations are
clustered at the participant level to ensure robust errors. The complete regression results are
shown in Table 6.
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Table 6. Multinomial Regression Results

Main Effects
Intercept
Treatment
Age (10)
Male
Balance ($10K)
Tenure
High wealth
Household income low
Household income high
Web registered
Interaction Terms
Treatment*Age (10)
Treatment*Male
Treatment*Balance ($10K)
Treatment*Tenure
Treatment*High wealth
Treatment*Household income low
Treatment*Household income high
Treatment*Web registered
Clustering at Participant-level
Observations
# of Participants
R Squared

Dependent Variable:
Expected Real Return
Mean
Before=.0486
After=.0583
Difference=.0090
Estimates
0.0479
0.0299
-0.0023
0.0073
0.0002
0.0003
-0.0020
0.0003
0.0010
0.0051
-0.0019
-0.0059
-0.0002
-0.0003
0.0015
-0.0004
-0.0007
-0.0046
Yes
20,590
10,295
20%

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
*
**

Dependent Variable:
Sharpe ratio
Mean
Before=.256
After=.318
Difference=.062
Estimates
0.2639
0.0535
-0.0014
0.0010
0.0010
-0.0010
0.0010
-0.0016
0.0024
0.0121

**
**
**
**
**

**

Notes:
Signficant at .05 (**) or .10 (*) level.
Clustering at the participant level to ensure robust standard errors.
Results do not account for the "methdology adjustment" described in Endnotes.

**
**

**
**

**

0.0018
-0.0017
-0.0009 **
0.0009 **
-0.0011
0.0016
-0.0022
-0.0123 **
Yes
20,590
10,295
27%
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Endnotes
1

See Hancock (2002) and Vanguard (2002) for measures of financial literacy. For information

on participant allocation patterns, see Vanguard (2006a) and Munnell and Sundén (2004).
2

For a discussion of behavioral biases in defined contribution plans, see: Thaler and Benartzi

(2001); Benartzi and Thaler (2002); Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang (2004); Brown, Liang and
Weisbenner (2006); and Iyengar and Jiang (2006).
3

For a discussion of the role of procrastination and inertia in financial decision-making, see

Madrian and Shea (2001); Ameriks and Zeldes (2004); and Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick
(forthcoming). For 401(k) trading research, see: Agnew, Balduzzi and Sundén (2003); Mitchell,
Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi (2006); and Yamaguchi, Mitchell, Mottola and Utkus (2006).
4

See Hancock (2002) and Vanguard (2002) for measures of financial literacy. For common

household financial mistakes, see Campbell (2006). For a discussion of financial literacy among
older Americans, see Lusardi and Mitchell (2007).
5

These participants were drawn from 19 organizations with 37 plans and 242,412 unique

participant accounts.
6

In total, 95% of participant portfolios fell in this range after managed account implementation.

See Vanguard (2006b) for full details about adoption of the managed account service.
7

This 401(k) approximation is a good measure of the overall market participation rule, since

equity exposure in 401(k) plans can be obtained with no minimum balance constraints and with
no transaction costs (such as sales loans) in our sample.
8

The PPA requires that plans offering company stock notify participants of their “right to

diversify.” The Internal Revenue Service builds on this provision with Notice 2006-1-7—which
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states that “if you invest more than 20% of your retirement savings in any one company or
industry, your savings may not be properly diversified.”
9

Company stock classification superseded equity exposure classification, so, for example, a

participant with between 40 and 95% equity exposure but over 20% company stock exposure
would be classified as Red (Company Stock).
10

In our sample, many international stock funds included an allocation to emerging market

stocks.
11

Even among the participants diversifying their portfolios more broadly, we are not assessing

whether their portfolios conform to detailed asset allocation rules, such as the proportion to be
invested internationally, that our experts might recommend.
12

13

See Viceira (Chapter X, this volume).
We use registration for 401(k) internet access used as a proxy for degree of financial

engagement.
14

See Smith and Stewart (Chapter X, this volume).

15

We estimated portfolio expected returns and variances at two points in time: September 2004,

prior to the introduction of the managed account service in late 2004, and December 2005, the
end point of our analysis. Expected real returns for the ith participant account at time t are simply
N

the weighted average of expected real returns for the k assets in the plan: E (ri ) = ∑ ω k ,t E (rk ) .
k =1

Portfolio variances based on the variance-covariance matrix Σ̂ are: Σˆ i = ω i',k ,t Σˆ ω i ,k ,t . Each ith

account’s Sharpe ratio is its excess return over the risk-free rate divided its portfolio standard
deviation, ri − r f / σ i . Other details about the calculations, including the “methodology
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adjustment” needed to capture the “drift” in the Financial Engines return-covariance matrix, is
summarized in Vanguard (2006b).
16

See Clark and d’Ambrosio (Chapter X, this volume).

17

Sponsors may forfeit so-called 404(c) fiduciary protection in doing so. But they may choose

to map the plan if, as plan fiduciaries, they judge such a move to be in the best interests of plan
participants. There is anecdotal evidence that some sponsors have undertaken such mappings,
usually providing participants with the right to “opt out” of such changes and retain their existing
holdings.
18

See Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus and Sunstein (2007).

19

Helman, Copeland, and VanDerhei (2006).

